Hoping to persuade the peoples of the Overseas Territories to vote for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic and thus inaugurate the French-African Community, General de Gaulle, as Premier of France, toured French West and Equatorial Africa the month preceding the referendum.
The official party included Pierre Pflimlin, former premier and now Minister of State in the de Gaulle Government, and Bernard Cornut-Gentille, Minister of Overseas-France. De Gaulle's itinerary was planned to take him to five capitals in French Negro Africa, all of them major centers of nationalist ferment: Tananarive (Madagascar), Brazzaville (French Congo), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Conakry (French Guinea), and Dakar (Senegal). De Gaulle's aim in making the trip was really twofold: to persuade the African leaders of these territories to rally behind him in a reorganization of the French Union, and to gauge at first hand the character and strength of the nationalist movement in sub-Saharan Africa.
Tananarive was the first stop. The thirty-thousand persons assembled at the airport gave De Gaulle a lukewarm reception. He made two speeches, one before the 240 members of the Territorial Assembly and the other to a crowd of ten thousand gathered in the public square in front of the old royal palace. At the conclusion of De Gaulle's first address, Premier Philbert Tsiranana 1 pledged his firm support in the referendum. The Madagascan public was much cooler 2 ; the brutal French repression of the abortive nationalist revolt of 1947 was still fresh in their minds 3. Much to the disappointment of the Madagascans, De Gaulle failed even to allude to the three nationalist leaders Nho had been prisoners in France since 1947 4; much less did he promise an amnesty for them. Nor did De Gaulle even once use the magic word “independence.” From Tananarive De Gaulle went to Brazzaville, where he received (August 23, 1958) one of the warmest and most enthusiastic welcomes of his entire journey. It is easy to see why the reception in Brazzaville differed so markedly from that in Tananarive. The French Congo (like most of French Equatorial Africa) had largely escaped the strong currents of nationalism that had engulfed much of French Africa and, unlike Madagascar, it had known neither violence nor repression. Moreover, in 1940, when Félix Eboué rallied the Equatorial territories to the Free French, De Gaulle had made his first African headquarters in Brazzaville. Now he was welcomed as a hero returning home.
The warmth and sincerity of the welcome, however, were not enough to conceal the uneasiness which many Equatorial political leaders felt over the Constitution De Gaulle was asking them to support. They had strong reservations about its viahility, but were disturbed most by the lack of specific provisions for obtaining eventual independence. Within a few hours after De Gaulle's arrival in Brazzaville, Barthelemy Boganda, President of the grand conseil of French Equatorial Africa and head of the Ubangi Shari section of the Parti de Regroupement Africain (P.R.A.), presented General de Gaulle with a memorandum signed by him and other Equatorial political leaders declaring that:
“We ask the French Government to insert in the Constitutional texts: ‘France recognizes the independence of her Overseas Territories.’ They can reap its benefits when they wish. As a consequence, a simple unilateral decision of the assemblies and councils rconseils de gouvernements, of the local governments would suffice to make this independence effective.” 5
In a series of private conferences the following day, General de Gaulle gave his personal assurance that the right to future independence would be solidly and unequivocally written into the new Constitution. This promise allayed the fears of the nationalist leaders, and thus won their pledge of support. On August 31, 1958, before three-hundred P.R.A. officials and party workers assembled in Bangui (capital of Ubangi-Chari), to hear a report on the consultations between De Gaulle and African leaders, Boganda came out flatly for an affirmative vote in the impending referendum. His announcement moved P.R.A. leaders from other French African territories to issue a joint declaration from Paris on August 31 (1958) that the party was moving toward acceptance of the new Constitution 6.
From De Gaulle's remarks in Brazzaville, there had been derived a principle which was to be important in winning the support of French Africans for the new Constitution: self-determination for the Overseas Territories and their right to opt for independence at any time they chose. De Gaulle had broached the subject of self-determination in a speech in France early in August 1958. He said then that any territory that rejected the Constitution on September 28 would thereby secede from the French community of peoples and, he added, would have to incur the consequences. However ominous this last reservation might appear, the implication was that if a territory hoped to gain its independence the sensible course would be to seize the occasion provided by the referendum of September 28, lest another opportunity should never arise. De Gaulle quickly realized, however, that such a challenge was scarcely the way to win the support of militant African nationalists for his new Constitution. He never again used this argument.
De Gaulle's statement at Brazzaville had introduced a new element: the right of a territory to secede even after it had accepted the Constitution. De Gaulle's position at the time was that whenever the parliamentary body of a territory should decide to separate its destiny from that of France, it could do so provided a territorial referendum first ratified the decision and other members of the community (including France) gave consent. To many Africans the latter condition seemed to vitiate De Gaulle's assurances of “providing for independence”, since it appeared to set up a veto power which, they fecred, France would use. Thanks to the quick thinking of Cornut-Gentille, De Gaulle's Minister of Overseas France, African fears were dispelled. At a press conference after the Madagascar speech, Cornut-Gentille declared that it was inconceivable that France would exercise a veto when the territorial peoples had made their will unmistakably clear.
From Brazzaville, De Gaulle and his party flew on August 24, 1958 to Abidjan, capital of the Ivory Coast. On arriving they were treated to a rousing welcome at the airport by more than thirty thousand Ivoriens bearing signs inscribed “Oui!” This cordial reception was due only in part to the warm friendship and close association between De Gaulle and Prime Minister Houphouët-Boigny. De Gaulle's tour throughout French Africa had been followed closely by the territorial press and broadcast over Radio Abidjan. Doubtless his remarks at the other two African cities (Tananarive and Brazzaville) accounted in no small measure for the enthusiasm which marked his orrival in Abidjan 7.
From Abidjan De Gaulle went to Conakry on August 25. As in Brazzaville and Abidjan, the public welcome was enthusiastic. Thousands of people lined De Gaulle's route from the airport into Connkry. Athough he was forewarned of the extremism of Guinea's [Prime Minister] Vice president of the Territorial Government of, Sékou Touré, it is unlikely that De Gaulle was either aware, or if aware was really convinced of the depth of the anti-French feeling in the territory. A clear picture of the fateful chain of events that sprang from De Gaulle's meeting with Sékou Touré is essential to an understanding of the achievement of Guinea's independence and must be treated in detail. (See pp. 129-131).
From Conakry De Gaulle went to Dakar, the final stop on his trip through French Black Africa, and his most difficult test. Despite advance warning 8 that the reception in Dakar might be “difficult”, De Gaulle would not be dissuaded from speaking there. When he arrived in Dakar on Aueust 26, he found thousands of Africans awaiting him at the airport bearing signs reading “Immediate Independence!” and waving red flags with the “black star of Africa”. 9. They threw into the air disks of yellow paper printed with the triple slogan: IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE, A FEDERAL AFRICAN NATION, CONFEDERATION WITH FRANCE.
Hundreds of hecklers were interspersed through the crowd, most of them members of an extremist organization, “The Committee for the Defense of the Democratic Liberties of
Dakar.” The principal opposition, however, stemmed from the P.R.A. (Parti du Regroupement Africain) 10, which controlled Senegal and had taken an extreme nationalist stand at its congress at Cotonou earlier that same month. A similarly tense atmosphere prevailed the following day when De Gaulle addressed a crowd of fifteen thousand in Dakar's main square. While not violent, his listeners were openly hostile. The P.R.A. leaders on the platform with De Gaulle were moderates 11, but their efforts failed to calm the Senegalese, who made such a din that De Gaulle could scarcely be heard as he made his now routine request for endorsement of the proposed Constitution.
One by one, the African political leaders rose to demand the very thing that De Gaulle had already offered: a formula for obtaining independence at the option of the individual territories. From Paris, meanwhile, Senghor and Dia issued a public apology through the press for the discourteous way General de Gaulle was received by certain citizens of Dakar. Both, however, reaffirmed their support of the three demands formulated by the P.R.A.'s August conference at Cotonou: immediate independence, an African federation, and confederation with France. This program was difficult to reconcile with De Gaulle's concept of the Community, which merely acknowledged the right of independence for the member states. Nevertheless, virtually all P.R.A. leaders 12, mindful of the need for continued financial assistance from France, were extremely reluctant to reject De Gaulle's proposed Community and to come out openly for a negative vote.
As he left French Black Africa and headed for Algiers, De Gaulle had reason to be pleased with his accomplishments. Madagascar and French Equatorial Africa were firmly his; the Ivory Coast would surely vote “Yes,” and its powerful leader, R.D.A. chief Houphouët-Boigny, could be expected to rally most of French West Africa to vote with him. Despite the unfriendly reception at Dakar, it was unlikely that Senegal would vote “No” on September 28. Guinea was the only real problem …
[Note. — Read also Ahmed Sékou Touré (1922-1984). Président de la Guinée de 1958 à 1984, specifically Chapitre 25. 25/26 août 1958, De Gaulle à Conakry. — Tierno S. Bah]
The encounter between General de Gaulle and Sekou Touré in Conakry on August 25, 1958, when both addressed the Territorial Assembly, was the turning point in Franco-Guinean relations. Touré's speech, which strongly denounced colonialism 13, left no doubt that unless the new Constitution met his demands 14, Guinea would assuredly vote “No” in the referendum, thereby severing her ties with France and the rest of the French Union. De Gaulle, angered by Touré's attack on the colonial administration, replied that Guinea could opt for independence on the 28th of September, but that she would have to “assume the consequences.” 15
Some weeks later, on September 14, 1958, the leaders of the R.D.A. met at Conakry to hammer out a common policy for voting in the referendum. Rallying behind Houphouët-Boigny, the party leaders of the various territories one after another declared their confidence in General de Gaulle and pledged themselves to vote “Yes.” Doubtlessly many were influenced by French assurances that an affirmative vote would not preclude the achievement of full independence at a later date and that meanwhile their territories would continue to benefit from continued French financial assistance. The only exception was Sékou Touré. Speaking for the P.D.G., he asked for immediate independence of his territory. That same day, at the P.R.A. conference in Niamey (Niger), convened for the same purpose, the leaders of the Guinean section of that party, Barry III and Barry Diawadou, independently indicated their own decision to vote “No.”
Events now moved swiftly in Guinea. On September 17, 1958, at the now famous réunion commune in Conakry, Sékou Touré met with Barry Diawadou and Barry III, the leaders, respectively, of the B.A.G. (Bloc Africain de Guinée) and the D.S.G.-M.S.A. (Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée [affiliate of] the Mouvement Socialiste Africain), the major “opposition” parties in Guinea, and both associated with the Parti de Regroupement Africain. Together they planned a campaign for all-out mobilization of the masses to vote against the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.
While a vigorous campaign was being waged throughout Guinea by the cadres of all three parties, Touré tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade Barry Diawadou and Barry III to merge their parties with the P.D. G. Although for the moment unwilling to go so far, the two leaders did agree to issue a communique jointly with Touré urging members of all three parties to vote “No.” The communiqué was generally accepted for what in fact it was: tacit recognition of the pre-eminent position of the P.D.G. and of Touré's undisputed control over it.
[Note. — On this topic, read also, inter alia
La Guinée : Bilan d'une Indépendance
Guinea: The Mobilization of a People
Ahmed Sékou Touré (1922-1984). Président de la Guinée de 1958 à 1984. — Tierno S. Bah]
The stage was now set for the historic referendum. The colonial administration in Guinea set up 1,692 polling places in the territory to ensure that the populace would have ample facilities to express its will.
As of the 27th of September, all bars, cafes, cinemas and market places were closed to assure the maintenance of public order during the polling hours. Public meetings and demonstrations were banned and even the ubiquitous tom-tom was placed under interdiction. On the eve of the referendum, the P.D.G. broadcast a last-minute appeal over Radio Conakry urging all Guinean Moslems (80 percent of the population) to vote “No” on the morrow.
The early hours of September 28 saw a massive but orderly turnout all over the country, from the capital city of Conakry to the remotest hinterland of Uppor Guinea and the Forest Region. As can be seen from the chart on the following page, voter turnout was extraordinarily high.
Well before the polls opened, at eight o'clock in the morning, long lines of voters, men on one side and women on the other, waited to cast their ballots. In many areas a majority of the returns were in before noon. The first count, in Conakry, revealed a pattern that was to be followed rather generally throughout the country. Of the first 9,147 votes counted in that city, 9,142 were “No” votes. The efficient P.D.G. organization, which over the past few years had meticulously built up an impressive system of communications with the bush, proved its worth: of 1,405,986 registered voters (of whom 1,200,171 voted), 1,130,292 voted “No.” 16
Of the 56,959 “Yes” votes, 27,440, or more than half, came from the circumscription of Labé 17, a Foulah area in the heart of Fouta-Djallon. The extraordinary degree of abstention in the Labé area — almost 50 percent — led some of the white residents in the region to speak somewhat wistfully of a “Foulah opposition” to Sekou Touré and to the Malinke-dominated. P.D.G. 18
| Guinea: Voting results in the referendum of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, September 28, 1958 | ||||
| Circumscription | Registered Voters | Number Voting | “Oui” | “Non” |
| Beyla | 73,401 | 71,973 | 37 | 71,764 |
| Boffa | 33,422 | 31,544 | 133 | 31,368 |
| Boké | 40,476 | 31,070 | 99 | 30,951 |
| Conakry | 44,389 | 41,513 | 991 | 39,232 |
| Dabola | 20,349 | 19,247 | 8 | 19,225 |
| Dalaba | 45,128 | 31,523 | 6,903 | 24,676 |
| Dinguiraye | 26,537 | 23,537 | 76 | 23,438 |
| Dubréka | 45,479 | 44,109 | 23 | 44,049 |
| Faranah | 35,595 | 33,835 | 0 | 33,124 |
| Forecariah | 42,206 | 40,309 | 30 | 39,632 |
| Gaoual | 31,551 | 26,711 | 73 | 26,634 |
| Guéckédou | 59,771 | 57,089 | 1 | 57,070 |
| Kankan | 79,869 | 66,358 | 693 | 63,590 |
| Kindia | 55,213 | 53,928 | 1,021 | 49,904 |
| Kissidougou | 71,039 | 64,017 | 70 | 63,626 |
| Kouroussa | 43,476 | 31,940 | 643 | 31,200 |
| Labé | 113,349 | 68,471 | 27,440 | 40,143 |
| Macenta | 90,622 | 85,963 | 97 | 85,808 |
| Mamou | 54,562 | 44,288 | 455 | 43,453 |
| Mali | 53,328 | 41,779 | 5,701 | 33,824 |
| N'Zérékoré | 104,510 | 85,312 | 2,158 | 83,001 |
| Pita | 52,586 | 52,300 | 3,117 | 48,634 |
| Siguiri | 80,488 | 71,841 | 377 | 71,514 |
| Tougué | 29,256 | 21,024 | 3,905 | 17,006 |
| Télimélé | 52,426 | 37,584 | 2,907 | 34,527 |
| Younkounkoun | 26,958 | 22,906 | 1 | 22,899 |
| Totals | 1,405,986 | 1,200,171 | 56,959 | 1, 130,292 |
| Source: “Les résultats du scrutin pour la Guinée,” Touré, II, p. 9. | ||||
Labé, however, was an exception. In all other parts of Guinea, the P.D.G. won an overwhelming endorsement for its policy of pulling Guinea out of the French community of nations 19.
[Note. — The landslide resulted from the separate yet identical decision to vote “No” by both the PDG and its rivals. Thus all parties and politicians shared in the massive endorsement. Nonetheless, ballot stuffing did occur here and there. The euphoria was, indeed, short-lived as the lethal PDG dictatorship gradually took place. Sékou Touré meted out death sentences and had Barry Diawadou and Barry III executed successively in 1969 and 1971. A heavy price, indeed, paid for their genuine ralliement to the PDG. — Tierno S. Bah]
The P.D.G. rolled up a massive “No” vote not only in the hinterland, where its communications system with bush villages and the absence of French influence were to its advantage, but in the important urban centers as well. In the most important of these — Conakry, Kindia, Mamou, Dabola, Beyla and NZérékoré — Touré's party polled well over 95 percent of the votes. The landslide figures of the referendum of September 28 not only were a de facto declaration of Guinean independence, but constituted an overwhelming endorsement of Sékou Touré and the P.D. G.
It took only two months and a day for the Guinean cadre of the P.R.A. to adjust itself to the new situation. On November 29, 1958, with Barry III as Secretary-General and Barry Diawadou as Coordinating Secretary, the Party instructed its members to affiliate unconditionally with the P.D.G. The same day, the Second National Conference of the P.D.G. passed a resolution acknowledging the absorption o the P.R.A. into its ranks 20.
Organized opposition to Sékou Touré and to the P.D.G. had come to an end. Guinea, now independent, had one political chief, absolute master of one monolithic political party.
[Note. — Actually, among the cadres of the PDG Sékou Touré's leadership did not go unchallenged, both in style and in substance. Read “The Parti Démocratique de Guinée and the Mamou ‘deviation’” — Tierno S. Bah
The same day that the outcome of the vote in Guinea was announced (September 28, 19 58), the French Government, through its administration in Conakry, issued the following communique:
“Article One of the Constitution specifies that: the Republic and the peoples of the Overseas Territories who, by an act of free choice, adopt the present Constitution, institute a Community.
By the vote of September 28, the Guinean electorate refused the aQoption of the Constitution submitted for its approbation.
By this act, Guinea is separated from the other territories of French West Africa which approved the Constitution.
By this act, the Constitution shall not be promulgated in Guinea.
By this act, Guinea no longer has an accredited representative in the Community, metropolitan or African bodies.
By this act, Guinea can no longer qualify to receive the assistance of the Administration of the French State or credits for matériel.
By this act, the responsibilities assumed by the French State in Guinea will be subject to revision.
To avoid disturbing the administrative and financial functioning of the Territory, the functionaries of the French State serving in Guinea will remain at their posts for the present, but a plan for the transfer of these functionaries to identical posts in the other Territories will be established and regulated by the High Commissioner in French West Africa and put into application within two months by a progressive and methodical plan.
Similarly, the suspension of equipment operations will permit no new enterprises.” 21
After the referendum, Sekou Touré, as Prime Minister of the Territory of French Guinea, formally submitted his government's resignation to the Territorial Assembly 22. Meeting in extraordinary session on October 2, 1958, the Assembly proclaimed the independence of the Territory and its designation as the Republic of Guinea 23.
The Territorial Assembly was reconstituted as a sovereign National Constituent Assembly, and the title of deputy was bestowed on all its members. By acclamation Sékou Touré was named President of the new republic and his government was confirmed by the Assembly. Guinea's Proclamation of Independence affirmed the new nation's adherence to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and authorized Guinea's application for membership in the world body. The Assembly accorded the Government full powers to direct the affairs of the country and to take all measures necessary to the national interest.
French authority in Guinea ceased at midnight, September 30, 1958. At that hour, the French Republic relinquished its sovereignty to the Territorial Assembly and its conseil de gouvernement. Governor Jean Risterucci, General de Gaulle's special representative in Conakry, announced in a press conference on September 29, 1958, that although the services of the French State would cease to operate after September 30, French functionaries serving in Guinea would be allowed to remain at their posts for two months, until November 30, if they wished, to allow a smooth transition from French to Guinean authority.
[Note. — Read also André Lewin. Ahmed Sékou Touré (1922-1984). Président de la Guinée de 1958 à 1984. Chapitre 27: 29 septembre 1958. Les difficiles lendemains du référendum. — Tierno S. Bah]
After November 30, functionaries wishing to remain in Guinea would be allowed to enter into personal contracts with the new government, whereupon appropriate procedure for their separation from the French Government would be begun. The French Government promised that those who chose to leave Guinea would be given primary consideration for assignment to other areas of French West Africa. Exception was made for technical personnel in the air and maritime security services and for officers of the French Treasury. These workers were ordered to remain at their posts during the two-month transition period and until they received further instructions from Paris.
The Guineans contend that the withdrawal of French functionaries was deliberately and unnecessarily abrupt; that, although De Gaulle allowed two months for the removal of French personnel, this was not sufficient time to find and train Guinean replacements. The French contend that the Guineans were anxious to have them leave so that they could themselves assume power. They point out that almost immediately after independence Sékou Touré asked that all European commandants de cercles be removed as quickly as possible 24. It may be argued whether De Gaulle set the two-month limit as a deliberate attempt to cripple the young nation, or did Guinea a favor by granting as much time as he did for the transfer. Even allowing for his desire to avoid the administrative upheaval (of the sort which later characterized the Belgian withdrawal from the Congo), it is difficult to see how it could have been expected that a qualified civil service of Guineans might have been trained in so short a period of time.
Two days after Guinea had obtained her independence, her exports (chiefly bananas, coffee, peanuts and palm oil) ceased to be admitted to France under the favored-nation treatment accorded other French-African areas. All investments by the central investment agency for the Overseas Territories (F.I.D.E.S. ) 25 were halted immediately, and projected investments were cancelled.
French financial assistance to the Guinean territorial treasury was suspended. It was announced that after October 1, 1958, all administrative and judicial services of the French State, not specially provided for, would cease.
Sékou Touré's rejection of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic brought independence to his country, but it isolated Guinea from the rest of the French African territories, which had voted to join the new Community. It completed Guinea's estrangement from the R.D.A. in the other territories, a phenomenon which had been developing over the past two years. Touré was convinced that to follow the lead of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast and President of the R.D.A. who advocated a closer union with France, would be to betray the ideals of Bamako. Touré became a champion around whom the more extreme anti-colonialist elements in the R.D.A. naturally rallied. These two men, Houphouët and Touré, symbolized for many thousands of West Africans two opposing policies. The Ivory Coast leader was commonly pictured as mature, distinguished, very much the African grand seigneur, personifying the Franco-African assimilationist ideal. Touré was seen as the scion of an ancient African dynasty, a young revolutionary, the champion of his people, whom he sought to deliver from the “chains” of French imperialism. In reality, neither quite matched the portrait painted of him by the metropolitan press or by his opponents 26. On many issues they were in far greater agreement than was generally recognized 27.
Genuine differences did exist, nevertheless, between the leadership of the P.D.G. and that of the parent R.D.A. These centered chiefly on the form which the Community should take and the degree of autonomy which the member states should enjoy therein. These disagreements on basic issues could only increase tension between the two groups 28. In a speech before a territorial conference of the P.D.G. at Conakry, September 14, 1958, Touré warned that “the African leaders who invite the masses of their territories to vote “Yes” will tomorrow have to bear heavy responsibilities before history which their popularity of the moment … will neither justify nor excuse.” 29 He did not mention them by name, but there was little doubt that he was referring to Houphouët-Boigny. The Conference unanimously approved the stand of Secretary-General Touré, and declared that the P.D.G. would vote “No” in the referendum, thereby opting for independence 30.
The conflict between the P.D.G. and the R.D.A. came to a head on the day of the referendum, when, as a result of the vote in Guinea, the divergence of the two parties became definitive. On October 19, 1958, the P.D.G. formally ended its affiliation with the R.D.A. By a special communique issued in Conakry on that date, the National Political Bureau of the Party declared that in view of the R.D.A.'s affirmative position on the referendum, the P.D.G. could no longer consider that party as embodying the real interests of the African liberation movement, and was, therefore, severing its ties with it:
The Political Bureau of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, after a profound examination of the political situation in Africa following the Referendum, and after analyzing the conclusions of the meeting of the Bureau of the Coordinating Committee of the R.D.A. held at Paris, October 7-9, 1958:
Holds that the decision of the Bureau of the Coordinating Committee to compel adherence, territory by territory, to the Community, denotes the definitive balkanization of the Federation and gravely compromises African unity, which all the sections of the R.D.A. made the essential reason of their approval of the draft of the Constitution. The P.D.G. is stupefied by the unmistakable declarations of the President of the R.D.A. defining the Community, not as a means of emancipating the African masses in the sense of sovereignty and independence, but as a structure definitively integrating the fragmented African states into the French Community.
The P.D.G. affirms the manifest incompatibility between its conception of the personality and the dignity of the real aspirations of Africa and its adherence to the R.D.A., whose President now openly extols the maintenance of Africa in subordination, thereby sacrificing the African personality and renouncing the anti-colonialist vocation of the movement.
It is clear that this attitude on the part of the President of the R.D.A. is obviously a retreat from the possibilities of option offered by the French Constitution.
The Political Bureau of the P.D.G. renders homage to the far-sightedness of its Secretary-General, Sékou Touré, whose political acumen has permitted Guinea to make a decisive choice giving to African unity its real meaning, and making a reality of the aspirations of the African masses to independence.
On the platform of national independence and of full sovereignty for Guinea, the P.D.G. solemnly proclaims that it no longer considers itself a part of the R.D.A. and that it is, henceforth, the natural ally of any section of the R.D.A., or of the P.R.A., or of any other democratic organization which clearly aligns itself in the struggle for independence, in view of the final objective which, historically, remains the formation of the United States of Black Africa 31.
Even after its secession from the R.D.A., the P.D.G. has continued to use the initials “R.D.A.” as part of its own official title (P.D.G.-R.D.A.), apparently as a symbol of its retention of ideals of which it feels it has become the sole trustee. The break with the R.D.A. was bitter and did much to polarize African sentiments around the two leaders, Touré and Houphouët-Boigny. Revision of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic to admit completely independent states as members of the Community, and the formation in May, 1959 of the Council of the Entente with Houphouët as its principal leader, helped somewhat to restore friendly relations between Sékou Touré and his former mentor. But relations oetween the two countries, Guinea and the Ivory Coast, remained strained.
Notes
1. Premier Tsiranana told a news conference on August 22, (1958), the day after General de Gaulle's departure, that he was supporting De Gaulle's proposed community as a step toward eventual independence. "If we remain in the Community it is because we are not yet ripe for independence. We shall ask for it one day." He went on to say that he hoped that this day would come as fast as possible but added that "even independent, we shall remain tied to France." New Times, August 23, 1958.
2. Much of the lack of response was apparently due to technical difficulties which developed at the last moment. The public address system functioned poorly and observers commented on how slowly and cumbersomely de Gaulle's remarks were translated from French into the Madagascan language.
3. During the 1947 revolt, it is conservatively estimated that 55,000 persons lost their lives.
4. The three were Joseph Raseta, Joseph Ravoahangy and Jacques Rabemanamjara, all of them prominent leaders in the outlawed Democratic Movement for Madagascar Renovation (M.D.R.M).
5. New York Times, August 31, 1958.
6. Ibid.
7. One of the people who met De Gaulle at the airport was Gabriel d'Arboussier, enfant terrible of the early days of the R.D.A. but once again in the graces of the Government as President of the Grand Conseil of French West Africa. D'Arboussier is reported to have said at the airport: “After General de Gaulle's address at Brazzaville, there is no doubt about the referendum.” New York Times, August 25, 1958.
8. While still in Brazzaville, De Gaulle was informed of a broadcast over Radio Dakar by Valdiodio Ndiaye, Senegalese Minister of the Interior, saying that Senegal had chosen independence within a French Confederation in keeping with the decision reached by P.R.A. leaders at their recent congress in Cotonou. Ndiaye called upon all Senegalese to remain calm and avoid public disturbances during General de Gaulle's impending visit. New York Times, August 24, 1958.
9. The symbol of the small but militant Parti Africaine de l'Indépendance (P.A.I.), an extreme nationalist organization.
10. See Chapter 4, p. 113.
11. Both Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia, Senegalese leaders of the P.R.A., were in Europe during De Gaulle's visit to Dakar and made it a point not to return for the occasion.
12. Djibo Bakary, Marxist-trained unionist and P.R.A. leader and head of the Government of Niger, was the only exception. He made it clear at the P.R.A. conference (Cotonou, August 1958) that he would call upon his followers to vote “No” in the referendum. Bakary was faced with strong pro-French sentiment in his territory, however, and he lost out on the issue when the French put heavy political (and military) pressure on the Nigériens to vote “yes”.
13. One of the things that most annoyed De Gaulle was Touré's remark that Guineans preferred “poverty in liberty to riches in slavery.” (“Nous préferons la pauvreté dans la liberté à la richesse dans l'esclavage.”) Touré, I, p. 80.
14. See Chapter 4, p. 118.
15. « On a parlé d'indépendance, je dis ici plus haut encore qu'ailleurs que l'indépendance est à la disposition de la Guinée. Elle peut la prendre, elle peut la prendre le 28 septembre en disant « Non » à la proposition qui lui est faite et dans ce cas je garantis que la Métropole n'y fera pas obstacle. Elle en tirera, bien sûr, des conséquences, mais d'obstacles elle n'en fera pas et votre Territoire pourra comme il le voudra et dans les conditions qu'il voudra, suivre la route qu'il voudra. » (“There has been talk of independence, and I say here, more loudly than elsewhere, that independence is Guinea's for the taking. She can take it, she can take it on the 28 of September by saying “No” to the proposition that has been put to her, and in this case I guarantee that the metropole will not put up any obstacles. She [the metropole] will, indeed, draw some conclusions, but she will create no obstacles and your territory will be able to follow the road it wishes, as it wishes, and in the conditions it wishes.” Discours du Général de Gaulle. Touré, I, p. 88.
16. Ibid., p. 9.
17. Ibid.
18. A more likely explanation for the peculiar vote in Labe was offered by Jean Bernard-Derosne, French correspondent for L'Aurore of Paris. He pointed out that the circumscription of Labé contained thousands of veterans and African military personnel who were fearful that a “No” vote would mean an end to the pensions paid them by the French Government — a belief, incidentally, which proved unfounded. The French Government to this day pays full pensions to Guineans who served with the French armed forces. Even during the most tense period of Franco-Guinean relations (March-August 1960), the French maintained treasury officials in Guinea to honor this obligation. See L'Aurore, 5 avril 1959.
19. In some areas the vote could only be described as astonishing. In the circumscription of Gueckédou, for example, of 57,089 votes cast in the referendum, only one was “Yes.” In Faranah, of 33,835 votes cast, 33,124 were “No,” while the electoral rolls indicated that no one had cast a “Yes” vote. In Younkounkoun, of 22,906 votes cast, 22,899 were “No” and only one was “Yes.” The official tally of votes as provided by Guinean sources does not explain the discrepancies apparent in these figures. Presumably they are due to spoiled ballots.
20. “Résolution finale de la deuxième Conférence Nationale des cadres du P.D.G.,” ibid., p. 242.
21. “La France prend acte du vote de la Guinée,” Touré, II, pp. 13-14.
22. “La démission du Conseil de Gouvernement, le 2 octobre 1958,” Touré, II, pp. 23-24.
23. “Proclamation de l'Indépendance de la République de
Guinée,” Journal officiel de la Republique de Guinée,
Débats Parlementaires, 1ère Année, No.1, 2 octobre 1958
(première séance) Imprimerie nationale, Conakry.
24. Shortly after completing a visit to Guinea, the English writer, Basil Davidson wrote: “There must have been, and I should think there still is, a good deal of quiet confusion, since the whole French ‘field administration’ of 45 commandants de cercles and assistants was withdrawn, by urgent request of the new government of Guinea within two or three weeks of independence.…” New Statesman, 11 April 1959, pp. 500-502.
25. Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (F.I.D.E.S.).
26. One of the most severe portraits of Sekou Touré was that which appeared in the right-wing French newspaper, L'Aurore in a series of articles called “La Guinée sans les français.” (“Guinea without the French”) Apri1 3, 5, 6, 7, 1959. Touré was pictured as little more than an opportunist, a “Janus” with one face turned towards the East and another turned towards the West. See also, Léonard Sainville, “The French Press and Guinea,” Présence Africaine especial edition on Independent Guinea, Vol. 1, No. 29 (Paris, n.d.), pp. 121-129.
27. Contrary to what is commonly believed, Sékou Touré did not oppose the idea of a Franco-African Community. His fear, expressed on many occasions, was that under the new organization, the federal structures of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa would be done away with, thus destroying the delicate strands of unity so painstakingly built up over the last century.
28. The Guineans also nursed many other grievances against the R.D.A. leadership. In the interest of party unity, they had often been forced on many issues (e.g. the French Government's war against the F.L.N. in Algeria, and its punitive action against Egypt during the Suez crisis) to support measures which the people of their territory did not approve.
29. Touré, I, p. 202.
30. “Résolution de la Conference territoriale tenue à Conakry le 14 septembre 1958,” Touré, I, p. 202.
31. “Communiqué du Bureau Politique,” Touré, II, pp. 140-141.
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