webGuinée / Etat & Société

La première décennie du régime PDG

Claude Rivière
Guinea: The Mobilization of a People

Ithaca. Cornell University Press. 1968. 260 p.

Chapter 7

The Strategies of National Integration

All African countries, once independent, are prey to internal conflicts, and they seek in different ways to bring about social integration The major forces hindering attainment of the unity needed by every developing nation are the disparities between tribes, in the inferior status of women, in the tradition of rule by the elderly, and in religious differences. How can antagonisms based on tribe, sex generation, and religion be overcome? What attitude should the government and citizenry adopt toward the traditional or mystical forces (which might well hamper the search for bold and up-to-date solutions to the problems of development) ? Such questions immediately confront an observer, especially in a country like Guinea, which boasts of being the standard-bearer of the « African Democratic Revolution. »
It should be emphasized that the PDG's strategy in dealing with tribal dissensions has been to serve as conduit for their many diverse forces toward a single objective As regards the gaps between men and women and between young and old, the PDG has attempted to strike an even balance, but in matters of religion it has insisted on submission to its authority even when that required using force against refractory elements. Undeniably, in each of those sectors of the society, a profound evolution has taken place. However, when one considers the trend of those forces and of the pace and scope of change, it seems more suitable to speak of social modifications or mutations than of evolution. If « social mutation » is taken to mean a sudden change in the basic structure of an entire social organism, following an upheaval caused by accumulated antagonisms, that term may well be applied to the radical changes of direction that have occurred in Guinean society.

Tribal Integration
The metamorphoses that have marked newly independent countries have often demonstrated the frailty of unity built upon a collection of heterogeneous tribes. In Guinea, the conflicts between ethnocentrism and nationalism have been surmounted, on the whole, to the latter's benefit. This can be attributed to the mingling of its tubes since the beginning of the twentieth century, but even more to the policy effectively applied by a political party.
Even during the colonial regime there had developed an awareness of African realities and a sense of black brotherhood in territorial federations, such as those of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. Those developments had several causes: the rotation of the elite, as represented by primary-school teachers and civil servants, among the different territories (often for the purpose of strengthening the colonial power's security, especially after World War II); military service, which served as a melting pot and exposed not only the recruit but also his family and village to the values of other civilizations; and the migrations of laborers because of the economic development and the growth of towns. As for the movements of labor, the decisive cause was economic upheavals.
The widespread application of the colonial trading system (économie de traite) forced a number of tribes to participate in the same economic circuit, as was the case with rubber around 1900.¹ Half a century later, the Kissi, Toma, and Guerze coffee planters realized that they had common interests and identical problems. In lower and upper Guinea, the introduction of a new crop (bananas) and new farming techniques (the plow) disrupted the existing ethnocentric social structures. Those structures had

• isolated villagers to the point of making them almost inbred
• encouraged abusive demands based on blood relationships
• assigned excessive importance to old men and to the masters of the land, and
• encouraged local myths and customs.

• scribes
• doctors
• schoolteachers
• government clerks
• soldiers
• foremen, and the like.

• first among communities that were already acculturated
• then in regions that were the most heterogeneous and where the tribal structures were most loosely knit, hence most accessible to a unifying ideology; and
• finally in direct relationship to the population's involvement in a trading economy, to such a degree that one might argue that it was the very opposition of economic interests that promoted Guinean unity.

These groups, formerly lacking any connections, thenceforth found their common denominator in the PDG's platform and in the struggle against the chieftaincy. Although economic activities in the forest region had become commercial in type, the situation was quite different in upper Guinea and in the Fouta-Djalon, where a subsistence economy prevailed. The inhabitants of the forest zone traded in coffee, palm kernels, and colas. Consequently, the commercial relations there between producers and capitalists were characterized by a conflict of interests. Having become aware of this situation, the producers' major demand was for an increase in the prices paid for their output. Indeed, only the PDG could organize a campaign against their exploitation by merchants - a struggle which transcended ethnic, tribal, or religious antagonisms. Only an organized political party could give a modern form to this common factor, which dominated the struggle on the economic level. The economic development and the social problems arising from this regional conflict helped the Parti Démocratique de Guinée to take root and to organize there. 5

• speeches designed to restore prestige to a country exhausted by economic restrictions: the promotion of
  • Samori
  • Alfa Yaya
  • Thierno Ibrahima N'Dama, and
  • Tierno Aliou, the wali of Gomba as national heroes who resisted the colonial conquest
• the leadership of a single party victorious over colonial wickedness and assumed to be capable of bringing happiness to the nation
• the adherence to a socialist ideology based on the comforting myth of equality between races, sexes, and occupations
• the emphasis on colonialism (which he equated with imperialism) as a scapegoat and on himself as ordained practitioner of the national psychoanalysis.

• Between 1958 and 1966, Malinkes formed 33 per cent of the total population and represented 40 per cent of the administrative staff and 36 per cent of the political personnel. 8
• Among the governors, regional secretaries, heads of central arrondissements, arrondissement commandants, that tribe accounted for 43 to 51 per cent.
• The Peul, on the other hand, constituted only 23 per cent of the administrative personnel, although they accounted for 30 per cent of Guinea's total population.

The Emancipation of Women
The political revival, combined with the PDG's struggle to acquire power, especially after 1953, provided women with the unforeseen opportunity to satisfy their hopes for emancipation. Since then, Guinea's women and its Party have been bound together by reciprocal activities. Women have supported the Party, and the Party has emancipated women.
The most radical measures changing the status of women were those put into effect shortly after independence. To strengthen the institution of marriage and to assure that it be freely contracted, the state took control over marriages by the ordinance of April 15, 1959.

• A civil ceremony performed in the presence of a registrar of vital statistics became the prerequisite for any religious marriage.
• In accordance with the resolutions passed by the PDG national conference, which met August 14-18, 1961, in Conakry, the law of April 14, 1962 (No.54/AN/62) laid down the conditions required for a marriage contract and the respective duties of husbands and wives.
• The legal marriageable age for girls became seventeen years (Art. 1), whereas formerly it was the custom for some girls to be affianced at twelve to fourteen years of age, or even before their birth.
• Another clause (Art. 2) required the consent of both parties for a valid marriage, although this did not eliminate the factor of family pressures.
• The amount of the bride price was restricted (5,000 FG for single persons and 2,500 for divorcees or widows), and it became the property of the wife, to whom it was delivered by the husband in the presence of the registrar of vital statistics. This gesture had a symbolic value, and the wife was no longer required to return the sum in case of divorce (Arts. 3 and 4).
• A woman was also given the right to prevent her husband from taking a second wife if she could prove that he did not have the means to provide a decent livelihood for them both (Art. 9).
• Finally, women were now legally entitled to control their personal property (Art. 13 ).

• a divorce must be pronounced before a law court (Art. 2) -- a radical step in that it ran counter to the practice of repudiation that had been widespread in this predominantly Muslim country;
• the court was empowered to grant damages to the spouse in whose favor the divorce had been granted (Art. 3), a provision aimed at providing a defense against capricious divorce suits, although in practice it failed to do so.
• It should also be noted that under the civil code, a widow could no longer be left destitute, for Art. 328 stipulated that a surviving spouse was a legatee, inheriting one-eighth of the estate if there were living parents or offspring, and as much as one-quarter if there were no such coheirs.
• Finally, a general resolution passed at the end of the first women's congress, on January 31, 1968, favoring the institution of monogamy was gradually spelled out in decrees. Polygamy was abolished « except in cases of force majeure. » Polygamous households already functioning when the resolution passed were not affected by these decrees, but in these cases the husband had no right to wed still another woman. 9

• the proportion of educated girls rose from one for every four boys in 1959 to one for every three by 1966.
• The first six years of independence brought a primary and secondary schools enrollment increase of
  • 215 per cent for boys
  • 397 per cent for girls
• During that same period, the over-all school attendance by girls jumped from 4 per cent to 20 per cent.

In the PDG, 8,000 special committees composed solely of women are functioning at the village and city-ward levels. Every year each of those committees democratically elects 13 members to form its executive bureau. Next, in each of the Party's 204 sections (220 by 1974) and 30 federations, there function a sectional and a regional committee, respectively, composed of women. Each of the sectional and regional committees is governed by a bureau of 13. Thus there is a grand total of 3,042 women elected to fill responsible posts.10

• struggles for power
• bourgeois ambitions
• a distaste for so called women's work
• sexual freedom
• and aberrations in interpreting emancipation.

The Political Mobilization of Youth
Because the views of young people have been decisive in changing women's status and attitudes toward economic development, in creating a secularity that made possible the eviction of religious authorities deemed to be competitive, and in providing dynamism for a revolutionary party, the PDG has always regarded the problems of youth as among the most important to be solved. That they were crucial was underscored by the census of May 1967, which showed that 55 per cent of the total population were under twenty years of age and 69 per cent were under thirty. This demographic situation, combined with certain psychological and social attitudes of the young (such as an awareness of their strength? reformist tendencies, and an aggressive attitude toward marriage and religious customs), induced political leaders to exploit youth by making it the vanguard of the revolution.
From the time of its creation on March 29, 1958, the Jeunesse de la Révolution Démocratique Africaine (JRDA) waxed in strength as the sole national youth movement, especially after similar movements based on ethnic or religious affiliations were abolished. The JRDA, composed of young Guineans between the ages of seven and twenty-five, was ideologically and politically dependent on the PDG. Despite some conflicts in authority during its first two years, between its youthful members and those technically or politically responsible for their activities - some of whom were incompetent or incapable of enforcing discipline - the JRDA succeeded in developing a more closely knit organization. Committees of ten boys and girls operated at the level of the city ward and village. These were subordinate to ten-member sectional committees, which, in turn, were under the supervision of regional committees. Capping this organizational pyramid was the JRDA's national council, which consisted of four delegates chosen by each regional committee, and which met once a year. Every two years a national congress was held under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Youth and Culture, who was responsible to the national politburo.
The movement's basic purpose was to give its members political training and a militant spirit, and this was to be achieved through activities placed under various ministerial departments. Groups were formed for sports, young women's interests, economics, art and culture, and social welfare. JRDA associations were started in schools and in the university, and Young Pioneers and People's Militias were also organized. At the age of seven, the child in primary school was absorbed into the Pioneer movement, which was integrated with the JRDA. That movement tried to supplement the education given by the family and the school by organizing activities stressing teamwork, emulation, and self-discipline. By means of informal talks, meetings, parades, and market gardening, it also sought to give a revolutionary content to its political, ethical, and civic training.
The indoctrination of youth was prolonged beyond primary school at the same time as the child's awareness of, and active participation in, projects for the nation's revival was cultivated. Children helped draft slogans and execute projects. Convinced of the PDG's monopoly of righteousness, the young JRDA members took it upon themselves to denounce the bourgeois youth of other African countries, and outdid Sékou Touré in his flights of eloquence against this or that imperialism or plots that might threaten the regime. They made statements favoring the abolition of polygamy and speculation on the bride price, denounced certain feminine styles as indecent or extravagant, took part in campaigns to promote farming and literacy, and organized athletic and cultural activities for their leisure time.
Sports, especially soccer, were viewed as means for promoting mutual understanding, honesty, and militant fraternity, because they served to mobilize and unite society. They also satisfied the African admiration for physical prowess, exemplified in the prestige of a charismatic champion. Next in order of importance after sports came artistic and cultural performances - theater, dance, instrumental music, and singing - as leisure pastimes. Such performances undoubtedly lent themselves to exhibitionism, but by the choice of themes for plays and songs, they were also useful as propaganda and as vehicles for inculcating morality and conformity. Although there were some very mediocre works, in which revolutionary ranting took the place of art, some of the reinterpretations of traditional melodies and dances were excellent. They served to heighten appreciation of the country's folklore, especially when combined with a degree of inventive genius, This could be seen each year in the « artistic fortnight, » geared to the high standards of performance set by Fodeba Keita's Ballets Africains.
Even more than such spare-time diversions, the activities of the People's Militias served as training for civic mobilization' and were also a means of self-defense and a bulwark against possible political plotters. Organized in villages and city wards, the Militias aimed to exercise control over youth in each locality, and thus to nip potential aberrations in the bud. Until the National Congress of the Revolution met in Labe, July 28-30, 1966, service in the Militia was directed toward reviving the rural economy and giving political training to young people of both sexes between the ages of twenty and thirty. Beginning in 1966, the paramilitary and repressive aspect of the Militia was intensified in consequence of the October 1965 « plot » of Petit Touré, the overthrow of Nkrumah on February 24, 1966, and the example provided by the Chinese Red Guards in August 1966 and thereafter. The Militia, often recruited from among the urban unemployed, served to back up the security forces, thus competing with the army and restricting its power, and it also acted as a Praetorian Guard. In the latter capacity, there was no assurance that the Militia would carry out its duties when the time came, for its braggarts would probably run for cover. Destructive in their zeal, militiamen would sometimes force their way into privately owned places and compel anyone they encountered to attend a meeting or a parade. They were immoderate and inopportune in their reactions, inexperienced, garrulous, and only recently indoctrinated. It is no wonder, therefore, that from time to time clashes occurred between these auxiliary police and the population or the army.
To the question of how-such activism and such political practices could become and remain productive and constructive only temporary answers were given. These included voluntary work in building roads, dispensaries, and maternity hospitals, and in collective farming, but such activities were no longer mentioned four years after independence. Next came the « workshops of the revolution, » which lasted only a brief time, to be succeeded by civic brigades. Those brigades still exist, but only sporadically and for some agricultural tasks or certain public works. Except when carried out under the CER's supervision, such assignments were of short duration. The mediocre accomplishments of what the PDG pompously called youth's economic role can be attributed to the following causes:

• impracticality
• improvidence
• fitful enthusiasm
• lack of technical means
• insufficient motivation because of poor and irregular pay
• embezzlement by responsible leaders of any profits that had been made
• the inability to learn from failure, and
• a persistent self delusion regarding aims.

1. Revision of curricula with the aim of inculcating authentic African values.
2. Giving free instruction at all levels.
3. Lengthening the period of compulsory schooling to nine years - six in the first cycle for children, beginning at age seven, and three years in the second cycle, to be spent in the agricultural or technical CER.
4. The extension of third- and fourth-cycle schools, which in April 1973 had 28,224 students in the lycées, and 5,050 in the national vocational schools (these together constituting the third cycle ), and 3,995 in the university and 1,381 state scholarship grantees living abroad (the fourth cycle). 12
5. Assigning precedence to scientific humanism and technical education over classical European humanism, all the classical and modern lycées having been transformed into technical lycées or national professional schools.
6. The linking of education with social and economic realities, national policy, and Party ideology.

• In 1958, the primary and secondary schools of Guinea were attended by 45,090 pupils.
• By 1973, the school system as a whole, including the university, had 285,340 registered students.
• Nevertheless, taking into account the growth of the population, the prolongation of compulsory schooling, and the dispersal of pupils among the various institutions, one can clearly see that the percentage of children between the ages of seven and thirteen who were attending school, compared with the total school-age population, had increased from 9 per cent in 1958 to only 33 per cent in 1964 and 36 per cent in 1973.
• The scope of the major effort made between 1960 and 1965 can be measured by the allocation to education of between one-fifth and one-fourth of the national revenues during that period.

• the traditional attitudes of illiterate parents
• a reluctance to send daughters as well as sons to school
• the utilization of children for minor agricultural tasks
• the geographical location of schools
• dissatisfaction caused by the incoherence of school reforms, and
• the overcrowding of one-class schools, where children barely learn to read after four or five years.

A noticeable decline in the quality of instruction has been caused by :

• the shortage of qualified teachers
• partial changes in the curricula
• a lack of homogeneity in the teaching corps
• overcrowding of classes and courses
• a relaxation of school discipline
• the irrelevancy of textbooks
• the inadequacy of educational reform, and
• a faulty system of promotion from grade to grade.

This failure to weed out the unqualified means that classes are cluttered up with a considerable number of mediocre pupils, so that the execution of our educational program is slowed down, sometimes to a serious extent. 14

As of 1973, the Higher Council of Education still regarded as crucial the problems of equipping schools with furniture and books and of training teachers. Aside from the quality of the instruction given, however, the remarkable effort made by the Guinean government to educate both young people and adults should be recognized.
In this writer's view, it is the school system that best reflects the socialistic commitment of the regime. The « cultural revolution, » as defined by the PDG at its sixth national congress in September 1967, could be interpreted as an effort to establish socialism by creating a proletariat, with youth playing the role of substitute proletarians in exercising control over the revolutionary process. China's cultural revolution raised a barrier against the bureaucratization of the administrative-political apparatus, and it took place after the political and economic revolutions. In Guinea, the cultural revolution tended to be a reaction against the further progress of an already well-developed bourgeoisie It was concurrently political, economic, and cultural, and it preceded the advent of socialism. Leaving aside all the theoretical speeches made to justify it, which could be applied at any time to any revolution, we shall examine Guinea's cultural revolution as a phenomenon produced by a combination of circumstances.
By stressing the « cultural revolution, » the head of state has implicitly tried to provide Guinean youth with a substitute for aggressive action, which might also serve to intimidate persons tempted to carry out a coup d'Etat. In practice, his strategy has worked out in this way:

1. Verbal pleas were made to revive zeal for farming under the leadership of youth. This followed failure of the cotton crop in 1966-1967 and recognition of an over-all decline in agricultural production. Pressure for a revival of farming was applied principally through the College of Rural Education, which was renamed the Center for Revolutionary Education. By 1972, some twenty CER ostentatiously termed themselves « socialist citadels.»
2. An opportunity for the strengthening of ideological indoctrination was offered to a population beginning to lose interest in politics.
3. The groundwork was done for a literacy campaign in the national languages; during the summer of 1966, the theme for this campaign was supplied by the solemn return of the ashes of Samori Toure and Alfa Yaya, figures symbolic of the struggle against colonialism and consequently against cultural alienation.
4. The emotions thus stirred up created an atmosphere propitious to launching the Local Revolutionary Power (PRL), a new organization at the village level in which the fieriest militants could supervise the activities of the basic party cells.

Socioreligious Mutations
The overpoliticization of Guinea's national life in a socialistic direction is quite as apparent in the attitude of the ruling elite toward religion. They have shown their firm intention to paralyze all religious institutions that do not become instruments of the single party's decisions. Illustrative of this determination was the arrest in January 1971 of the great Muslim imam of Conakry and of Monseigneur Raymond-Marie Tchidimbo, the Catholic archbishop. Formerly, the competition among Islam, Christianity, and indigenous religions 15 hampered national development less than the conflicts among the institutions set up and sanctified by religion and those promoted by the new society. Each religion had its own manner of reacting to political developments. The widespread influence exercised by sorcerers and healers in an animist society militated against the activities of the Party and the administration. The aristocratic structure of Muslim society was incompatible with the introduction of political democracy and economic reforms. Christianity, despite its slight influence, could hamper experimentation with bold and anti-French policies. Hence, the national politburo decided to launch campaigns aimed at « demystifying » animism, eliminating « maraboutism » from Islamic practices, and suppressing Christianity, with the aim of secularizing the country's institutions.
In the forest zone (inhabited by Kissi, Toma, Guerzé, Manon, and Kono tribesmen), the demystification campaign of 1959-1960 was as shattering as an earthquake, but its impact was much weaker in the coastal area (populated by the Nalou, Baga, and Landouman tribes). Strengthened by the prestige that it had acquired immediately after independence, the PDG profited by the favorable mood of the country's youth, and by the over-all decline in religious faith after 1954, displaying a remarkable tactical sense in undermining animism by blending pressure with persuasion. Its campaign was waged simultaneously on several levels, with the result that its targets had no time to rally their forces. The press and radio, using the vernacular languages as their medium, strove to give religious beliefs a rational basis.

• The PDG ordered each of its federations to lay bare to everyone the so-called secrets of cult-initiates and to stigmatize the abusive practices of magicians and fetishers.
• Initiation rites that involved prolonged periods of seclusion and physical ordeals, 16 as well as the celebration of major tribal ceremonies, were forbidden.
• The public authorities collected masks and fetishes, sometimes confiscating them.
• The gendarmes and police were ordered to quell those who resisted.
• Well-publicized trials and the general opprobrium cast upon human sacrifice mobilized public opinion against fetishism.
• Theatrical performances produced by all the Party sections continued to discredit fetishism by ridicule.
• The population of Guinea was deeply impressed by the burning of fetishes, the revelation of the so-called secrets of male society to women and children, and the publicly demonstrated fraudulence of the cries and gestures of the traditional masks.

• a ban on the tours made by marabouts to solicit alms; and
• a limitation of the number of pilgrims journeying to Mecca.

• March 26, 1959 - Suppression of the movements of Catholic youth and sports associations, and the like to the benefit of the JRDA.
• August 17, 1961 - Decision of the national conference of the PDG to suppress mission schools and to nationalize education, beginning with the academic year in October.
• August 26, 1961 - Expulsion of the archbishop of Conakry, Monseigneur Gérard de Milleville, who had protested against the previous measure.
• May 31, 1962 - Consecration at Conakry of a Guinean priest, Monseigneur Tchidimbo, as successor to Monseigneur de Milleville.
• May 1, 1967 - Decision to Africanize all the Christian clergy within a month, and to expel the 154 white missionaries (priests, nuns, friars, and their lay assistants) as well as the non-African Protestant ministers.
• January 24, 1971 - Sentencing of Monseigneur Tchidimbo to forced labor for life, on charges of treason and complicity in the plot and invasion of November 22, 1970; the real reason for this punishment was that he had become a critic of the regime after having been one of its supporters.

Unquestionably, social mutations are occurring in Guinea. Albeit irreversible in its orientation, the outcome of these changes is open to question. Tribal integration gives rise to the problem of adapting the individual to social, ethical, and economic situations in society as a whole, whereas until now he has had to conform only with those of a restricted group. The emancipation of women leads one to speculate on the consequences of the disintegration of the extended family, as well as on how the monogamous family will be structured. The political mobilization of youth causes concern about how young people will approach adulthood: Will they choose the path of reason or of violence, of solid qualifications or of empty pretensions, of progress or of animosity? How will they react to the viruses injected by the ideologies of affluent societies and of those that practice revolution?
The demystification and weakening of religious faith raises questions about the population's sense of security and about what will be found to replace it. Will syncretism harden into a doctrine and a cult? Will Islam and Christianity further their conquests through a process of adaptation? To what degree can nationalism satisfy Guineans who want material advantages? Will it play the role of long-established religions in meeting the need for happiness and prosperity, which was formerly satisfied by the existence of myths of the supernatural?
Forecasting the future is inevitably hazardous, inasmuch as revolutionary pride, a form of bourgeois consciousness, is making its appearance among the younger generation, which is moving toward the acquisition of high posts. Among other elements, however, the zeal to insure the triumph of socialism has been transmuted into concern for the restoration of social equilibrium, along lines closer to individual profit than to the generous disinterestedness inherent as a principle in radical ideologies.