New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1968. 291 p.
I followed the standard procedure observed by all American Ambassadors of submitting my resignation prior to the November 1960 election, so that the new President might be free to select his own diplomatic representatives. I did not receive word from the Department until the first week of February 1961 that the Kennedy administration had decided upon my successor. I was instructed to seek the written consent (agrément) of the Guinean Government for the proposed replacement. I was informed at the same time that the new Secretary of State was considering placing me in another position that would make use of my background, experience, and fluency in French. This word from the Department was followed by a letter from President Kennedy expressing appreciation for the service which I had rendered the United States and indicating that my resignation was to be accepted at a date to be determined.
I was very much surprised to learn that the new administration was contemplating my staying on in another capacity. I was committed to go to a new position as chairman of the French Department of Atlanta University, from which I had been granted a two-year leave of absence, thanks to the understanding and thoughtfulness of the president, Dr. Rufus Clement, and his board of directors. I had agreed to accept the position at Atlanta University just a month before the State Department had approached me in 1959 about going to Guinea. I felt obligated, therefore, to go to this academic post. On the other hand, there was the question of the challenge offered to me by the Kennedy administration. This could mean only that the new administration was taking this means of recognizing the job which I had attempted to do in Guinea.
For three days and three nights, during spare moments, I wrestled with the decision which was to influence so greatly the future course of my life. Finally, on the evening of the third day, I made my decision. I wrote to Dr. Clement explaining why I had decided to remain with the State Department.
The following day I let the Department know that I was interested in remaining and asked the nature of the new assignment under consideration. It was then that I learned that the Department intended to send me to Paris as the United States Permanent Representative to UNESCO. I was very happy at the thought of serving in Paris in such a capacity.
As the time drew near for me to leave Guinea, I hoped more than ever that the change in administration in Washington meant a change of policy toward Guinea and other emerging African nations. As it happened, my successors to the post in Guinea — two of whom were noncareer diplomats and one a career officer — Ambassador William Attwood (former foreign editor, Look magazine), Ambassador James Loeb (former newspaper editor), and Ambassador Robinson McIlvaine, were sent into Guinea by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations respectively with firmer and more knowledgeable commitments than I had had. I was glad for their sake and for the sake of the U.S. position in Guinea that this was the case.
With the suddenness and lack of explanation characterizing many official actions, I learned on March 1, 1961, that before reporting to my new post in Paris I was to report to Washington by March 6 to appear before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to be confirmed as Alternate Delegate to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. I was greatly surprised by this new development, but not overwhelmed. Certain basic realities kept me fully aware that I was not living in a dream world. There was, for example, the seemingly impossible task of closing the Ambassador's residence in three days-three days because I was determined not to leave my wife behind to face this task alone; there were the official calls of leavetaking, to be made on President Touré, his Ministers, and my diplomatic colleagues; there were innumerable other details to be arranged before I could feel free to depart.
When I saw President Touré at the Présidence, he expressed in the presence of National Assembly President Saifoulaye Daillo more than merely polite regrets that I was being called from Guinea. He said that he wished to write President Kennedy about the change, and when I demurred, he asked me to consider seriously staying on in Guinea as a private citizen to serve as adviser to his Government. I explained that this would not be fair to my successor and told him that each U.S. President had the right to choose his diplomatic representatives. I thanked President Touré for his sincere expression of confidence and told him that I could not remain in Guinea because I had agreed already to serve my Government in another capacity. When the Guinean Ministers saw me the next night at a reception at the Liberian Embassy, they were equally warm in the expression of their regret at the departure of my family and myself.
I had my last look at Guinea from the window of an Air France plane that left Conakry on Friday, March 3, 1961. As Conakry faded in the distance, my thoughts turned to the summer of 1958 when I had walked the hot and sometimes deserted streets of Paris vainly seeking passage to Algiers. I had not suspected that summer that I was standing on the threshold of a period that would afford a ringside seat to events constituting the raw materials out of which history is made. I thought about the first morning of our arrival in Guinea, of the warm reception at the airport, and of the subsequent events. I wondered seriously about the items which I could place on the credit side of the American-Guinean ledger. Fate had not decreed that I should have at my disposal a $35 million line of credit, as had the Soviet Ambassador. I had not been able to rely upon a $25 million interest-free loan, as could the Chinese Communist Ambassador. I could not lay claim to having supplied small arms for security purposes and to having secured barter trade agreements in moments of crisis, as could the Czechoslovakian Ambassador. My country had not agreed to construct a huge printing establishment in Conakry that could supply much of West Africa, as had East Germany. Nevertheless, I didn't feel as if I were trying to delude myself in concluding that my mission in Guinea could not be written off as a failure for the following reasons:
As the Air France plane moved toward Dakar, I thought about our numerous trips into the interior of Guinea and our wonderfully reassuring reception by the friendly Guineans out in the brush. I recalled their eagerness to hear about the great land of America, which wanted all people to be free. I remembered that these people in the brush thought that a straight, unencumbered road would lead them to freedom and peace, where they could enjoy the fruits of independence promised by the Guinean political leaders before the September 28, 1958, Constitutional Referendum. I could still visualize the varied landscapes of Guinea—the flat savannahs, table mountains, steep slopes, low-lying, partially swampy coastal area. I could hear the patter of the rain that fell during the six-month rainy period, and see the dust that settled in our eyes, ears, and nostrils as we traveled back roads during the six-month dry period. I could hear the roar of the beautiful Guinean waterfalls and understand why Guinea was referred to as the “watershed” or “water tower” of West Africa. I could see the pineapples, bananas, coffee, and rice being readied for market.
The thunder of airplane engines brought me back to reality as we landed in Dakar. One hour later we were bound for France, and after a thirteen-hour flight we reached Orly Field in Paris. Our friends at the American Embassy in. Paris were excited over my appointment to the American delegation at the United Nations. I could not reveal at this time my appointment to our delegation at UNESCO in Paris.
With some difficulty, the Embassy secured seats for us aboard a New York-bound TWA plane, and we were met that Saturday evening at the International Airport in New York by the genial and efficient administrative officer of the United States United Nations Mission, Fred Schottke.
We decided to stay in New York overnight and proceed to Washington Sunday evening. This was fortunate, because in the middle of the night I had to seek the services of a nearby hospital. An infection which had started in a toe of my right foot cut on a piece of laterite rock during my last swim in Guinea had started to spread up my leg. Miracle drugs speedily removed any threat of danger, but I had to appear at the State Department and at the hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with a shoe on my left foot and an African sandal on my right. I explained that I had received the injury in Guinea, but it had come neither from a hammer nor a sickle.
The setting for my second appearance before the Committee was much more informal than the first had been. The hearings were held in a much smaller room, and the Senators were seated on one side of the table with the nominee on the opposite side. Senator Fulbright was presiding. Also present were Senators Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Rep., Iowa), Hubert H. Humphrey (Dem., Minn.), and Stuart Symington (Dem., Mo.).
Appearing before the Committee that same morning were Philip Coombs, who had been nominated for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and George F. Kerman, who was being named Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Neither Mr. Coombs, an executive of the Ford Foundation, nor Mr. Kerman, brilliant career diplomat and noted scholar of Soviet affairs, experienced any difficulty with the Committee.
Senator Fulbright called me to the table, greeted me cordially, and informed the Committee that I had appeared before its members earlier in connection with my appointment to Guinea. He said that the Senators might have some questions to ask me. A busy forty minutes ensued. Senator Humphrey, who was particularly interested in the depth of Communist penetration in Guinea, led off in this hearing, which was open to the public. He asked about the steps taken by the Embassy to meet the Communist thrust. I gave direct answers to the questions of the Senator from Minnesota, hoping all the time that nothing I said would be misconstrued by the press or the public. I did not wish to add to the problems of my successor. Senator Symington followed, and instead of asking questions gave his estimate of what I had attempted to do in Guinea on behalf of America. I was gratified by the generous remarks of the Senator from Missouri.
Senator Hickenlooper was the most persistent questioner that morning, probably because of the nature of the answers given to his questions. He seemed interested in developing the theme that the United States should not give aid to developing countries that appeared to deal with Communist nations. He seemed convinced that Guinea was in that category.
I tried to point out tactfully that it was this very failure on the part of Western powers to aid Guinea in the beginning that had made it possible for the Communist bloc nations to become entrenched there. I indicated that the United States was giving very little aid to Guinea at that moment, therefore our discussion was largely theoretical. I said that I thought Touré was a fervent African nationalist with a Marxist orientation, who did not wish to be dominated either by the Russians or the Americans or the French. I asserted that my fear had been that we would not attempt even a “foot-in-the-door” operation and thus make it easier for the bloc nations to establish their bridgehead in West Africa. I concluded by saying that I felt that the United States should definitely develop an effective aid program in Guinea and try to ensure that Guinea would observe a true policy of neutralism.
During the forty-minute session I had not been asked a single question concerning my qualifications to represent the United States at the United Nations. An official explained after the hearing that the Senators were happy to get firsthand information on the Guinean situation and therefore had kept me in the chair longer than usual.
My mission to Guinea came to an end officially when the United States Senate, convening at noon on March 6, 1961, voted its approval of my appointment as Alternate Delegate (with ambassadorial rank) to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.
Today, more than five years later, when I think back to my tour of duty in Guinea, I cannot help conjecturing about the kind of aid policies the United States might have followed in Guinea and other parts of Africa if David Bell, Director of the Agency for International Development from 1963 to 1966, had been at the helm between 1959 and 1961. Bell was not afraid to admit that this business of trying to aid emerging nations was extremely complicated, and he did not hesitate to acknowledge that there were weaknesses in current U.S. aid policies. At the same time, however, he worked very hard to develop new and sounder policies. When Bell left the Agency, U.S. aid policies were on much firmer ground as a result of his efforts.
U.S. aid policies are being closely scrutinized by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Congress. The present difficulties in Vietnam have given impetus to the efforts of Senator William Fulbright, Committee chairman, to develop a foreign aid program which, in his words, “will isolate us from the political and possible military implications that attack our present bilateral system of aiding developing countries.” Fulbright has called attention repeatedly to what he calls the “unfortunate side effects” of the bilateral arrangements in Vietnam that have caused the United States to be identified with “certain” political regimes in this strife-torn nation.
The situation in Guinea in 1959 was not like the situation in Vietnam today; nevertheless, the presence in postindependence Guinea of the Communist bloc countries in full force, the unexplained arms build-up in this African republic, the failure of France to settle its monetary and political differences with Guinea, and the long-drawn-out aid negotiations between the United States and Guinea did create an unmistakable atmosphere of crisis there.
This atmosphere was heightened by our knowledge that Khrushchev had revealed as early as 1955 (December 30 speech following visits to India, Burma, and Afghanistan) a blueprint for the Soviet approach in Africa. Depicting the Soviet Union as the staunch opponent of colonialism with no history of colonies in Africa, Khrushchev had proposed moving into the breach as a friend bringing economic and technical assistance to the emerging nations, while allaying suspicions by promising easy terms and noninterference. It was to be only a matter of time, of course, for the Guineans to realize the harsh truth that the costly prestige projects such as sports stadia, huge radio transmitters, jet landing strips, tanks and antiaircraft guns, and a Guinean national airline (operating within Guinea and between Prague and Conakry) did not help to stabilize their struggling economy.
It will always be a matter for debate whether any policy other than our blundering one in Guinea really would have served our interests any better. One of the pervading weaknesses of U.S. aid efforts prior to recognition of the Guinean Government had been the tendency to contribute aid with the idea of combating Soviet influence and saving neutralist nations from the Soviet camp. These ofttimes futile attempts to counterbalance Soviet influence obscured the fact that aid was being given also in the hope of creating stable and secure states. The U.S. efforts to exclude Soviet aid or lessen the political effects of such aid served frequently merely to make us more susceptible to “competitive blackmail” by the neutralist or “nonaligned” states.
In Guinea, we were confronted with a leader Sékou Touré, who declared himself to be a “neutralist” in the same fashion as the leaders of other developing countries of Africa and Asia. Even prior to our confrontation with Touré, neutralists had created difficult problems for American foreign policy. In fact, there had been several policy reactions to the concept of neutralism, ranging from the late John Foster Dulles' declaration of the “immorality of neutralism” to reluctant U.S. support of neutralism—but not as expounded by Sékou Touré. I must admit that Toure's emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of neutralism, which supposedly served the “highest interests of humanity” and favored the “right of self-determination,” had little appeal to U.S. statesmen once they learned of the methods employed by Touré's Democratic Party of Guinea to render powerless Fulah chieftains in the domestic struggle for independence.
Had Touré really placed humanitarian motives above what he took to be the national interest, he would have experienced greater difficulty in obtaining independence for Guinea. He would have thought twice before giving even tacit approval to the use of coercion to force many Fulahs and their chieftains to vote for independence in the September 1958 Referendum. Touré might have reconciled himself to this situation by thinking that he was indeed serving the “interests of humanity” by providing the rest of Africa with the example of a developing nation following an independent policy. Undoubtedly, he felt that the success of the Guinean experiment was going to enhance the dignity of all developing peoples and reveal their possible future role on the international level.
At numerous times the Guinean policy of positive neutrality seemed to be somewhat opportunistic. But then there was also the case of the late Indian leader Nehru, who in countenancing armed intervention in Goa, seemingly discarded neutralism when it was deemed necessary for the perceived national interest. However, Touré, in believing that he could obtain economic aid from the West and the East, might have reasoned that if he did so his country stood less chance of losing its national sovereignty. He might have thought that Guinean neutralism would serve to reduce foreign influence by balancing the East and the West in “compensatory dependence.” Touré felt that his prestige as a national and international leader would be enhanced greatly if he could achieve several significant diplomatic coups. These coups would enable him to postpone at home the confrontation with pressing domestic problems. Unfortunately, Touré's plans for achieving diplomatic victories were thwarted because the Russians made the mistakes of giving useless aid and of intervening in internal affairs, while the United States and other Western powers reacted much too slowly.
I have always believed that Touré's radical stance stemmed not only from his anticolonial bias, but also from his frustration at the fact that the much-talked-about East-West confrontation, with its usually predictable concomitant of extensive economic aid, never moved into high gear. Touré's bias and frustration made it easier for him to believe that American aid agreements always had strings, whereas the simpler agreements of Communist bloc countries did not have any strings. (It is interesting to note that British officials showed great flexibility and ingenuity in devising a simplified form of agreement that contrasted sharply with the more difficult form of the U.S. bilateral agreement.)
For a charismatic leader such as Sékou Touré, who during the period of transition appeared to be the only Guinean capable of unifying his country, a foreign policy based upon neutralism was of inestimable help in asserting the identity, integrity, and uniqueness of a new republic made up of different tribal groups. The more recognition he gained on the international scene while pursuing his “middle of the road” neutralism, the more this prestige enabled him to stifle on the domestic front any nascent opposition. Touré stressed incessantly at home and abroad the uniqueness of the Guinean experience and the importance of Guinean independence.
It is my belief that the Republic of Guinea served as a laboratory not only for Africa, but also for the West and the East. It revealed what can happen to an emerging nation when it is struggling to achieve stability and viability and is attempting, at the same time, to safeguard its sovereignty. There were valuable lessons to be drawn from the Guinean experience by the United States in particular, because of its large foreign aid program and its role of world leadership. The revamping of the Soviet aid approach in Guinea and the rest of Africa was proof that the Soviet Union had learned from the Guinean experience. As far as France is concerned, it learned its lesson so well in Guinea that it did not experience similar problems with the remaining sub-Saharan African territories that sought independence soon afterwards. Indeed, France helped these nations become independent states and still managed to maintain economic, cultural, and social ties with them without incurring charges of “paternalism” or “neocolonialism.”
Obviously, the neutralism practiced by the Republic of Guinea is not in the same tradition as the neutrality exemplified by Switzerland, in which a state, strong and independent of external support, has been able to play the role of “bystander” in international politics. It would be unrealistic to think that a country as economically and militarily weak as Guinea, and as dependent for its development on foreign aid, could play the role of arbiter or mediator in international politics. The recent unsuccessful efforts of Ghana and Guinea, as well as several other developing nations, to serve as mediator between the United States and Hanoi point up the questionable ability of neutralist nations to mediate international disputes.
Guinea impressed me always as being ready to take a stand somewhere between the East and the West on crucial issues in order to protect its imagined bargaining position. More often than not the Guinean stand was closer to that of the East than of the West. Nevertheless, I am unwilling to go quite as far as Dr. Henry Kissinger, who believes that neutralist countries will not assume substantial responsibilities in coping with problems unrelated to their immediate interests. After all, Ghana and Guinea did offer to mediate in the crisis between North Vietnam and the United States. I do agree with Kissinger's belief that the tendency of neutralist countries to take a position somewhere between the contenders places a premium on Soviet intransigence. These countries have discovered that starting from extreme demands seems often to constitute profitable bargaining tactics. I admit also that any anticapitalist bias or any enlightened self-interest on the part of a neutralist country would place in question the ability of that country to serve justly as a mediator.
The whole question of the role of neutralist nations in international affairs presents a series of paradoxes, not the least of which is that the strength and safety of the stance of these nations depend upon the economic, political, and military strength of the United States. The ability of neutralist countries to serve as mediators depends upon the willingness of the West and the East to accept their mediation. The moment neutralist countries indicate a willingness to mediate, they bring upon themselves the pressures of the cold war which they claim they wish to avoid. These nations cannot remain truly uninvolved, because on certain issues, such as African problems, they are very definitely aligned on one side or the other. Under the present scheme of things, the neutralist Afro-Asian bloc is able at times to wield considerable voting power at the United Nations. Yet as soon as the UN discussions are ended, this same bloc has no real power to prevent unilateral action that might be taken by a dissenting great power.
The United States should have learned certain valuable lessons from its dealings with neutralist Guinea. For example, the State Department must never again be in the position of being without a sufficient number of Foreign Service officers who are knowledgeable in African affairs and African languages; the State Department must never again allow the problems of Africa to be settled largely in the Bureau of European Affairs rather than in the Bureau of African Affairs; the President, ably backstopped by an enlightened and efficient Secretary of State and State Department, must have the final say on policy. Furthermore, once it has been clearly established that the U.S. Chief of Mission in a foreign country has developed firm rapport with the President or Prime Minister, the members of the government, and the people, and has secured their confidence, the State Department should pay closer attention to the evaluations, policy suggestions, questions, requests, and advice of this Chief of Mission and his staff.
There were other lessons gained from U.S. contact with the Guinean situation, among which were at least two that proved invaluable in the subsequent reformulation of U.S. policy toward neutralist nations. The first lesson was simply that the United States must exert great care to avoid intervention or involvement in the internal affairs of the nations it seeks to aid. Perhaps we have followed this lesson closely in our dealings with countries other than Guinea, but I submit that the Soviet experience in Guinea clearly illustrated the danger of meddling in the internal affairs of a neutralist nation. Such meddling forced Guinea to turn in another direction to offset the continuing influence of the Soviet Union. The second lesson pointed up the importance of distributing aid not merely with the idea of combating Communist influence. Attempts to counterbalance Soviet political or economic influence by trying to swing the balance in our favor with aid deals have ended usually in our becoming more susceptible to “competitive blackmail” and to failure. Admittedly, the slogan of using foreign aid to win the battle over communism has been stressed in the past in order to get aid bills through the U.S. Congress; but this ploy for winning congressional support has also become part of the aid program itself.
Arthur Schlesinger, in describing Guinea's movement toward the Communist bloc countries in his recent book on the Kennedy administration, has stated incorrectly: “Touré even refused to receive Eisenhower's retiring ambassador for a farewell call.” Schlesinger does give, however, an excellent summary of the fundamental changes effected in the U.S. foreign aid program under the Kennedy administration. It is very noticeable that even with the transition from the “country store” and “projects” approach of the old ICA to the new AID emphasis on long-range national planning, economic development, institutional and cultural growth, and “stronger national independence,” neither the Kennedy administration nor the Johnson administration has settled the question of bilateral and multilateral aid.
Under the prevailing concept of bilateral aid, U.S. policymakers seemingly are sometimes put in the position of choosing between a “conciliatory” and a “discriminatory” policy.
They decide apparently on the basis of the international alignment or nonalignment of the nation aid recipient in question. When the policy makers are opponents of the aid policy, they declare it to be too “conciliatory” in that it provides aid for countries regardless of the degree of their neutrality. They contend that such a policy makes it easier for neutralist countries to support Communist bloc countries and still not have to fear the loss of U.S. aid; or they insist that this “conciliatory” policy encourages radical neutralism among nations that curry Soviet favor but do not wish to lose U.S. support altogether.
On the other hand, policy makers may maintain that the prevailing policy is too “discriminatory” if it seems to provide only for those countries adhering to less radical and biased neutralist policies. They then assert that a “discriminatory” policy does not necessarily encourage neutralist nations to take stands more favorable to the United States.
Whether the policy makers consider the aid policy “conciliatory” or “discriminatory,” they are alike in wishing to be reassured that the policy is administered according to the needs of the country in question, its perceived alignment in international affairs, and its strategic importance to the United States.
It is not too farfetched to predict that as our policy makers become more and more troubled by the aid dilemma they are going to give more serious thought to channeling U.S. aid through international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Development Association. These organizations are recognized as having the expertise and the experience necessary to ensure that unjustifiable economic projects will not be approved. Some members of Congress will not be happy at the prospect of using international organizations for aid purposes, because they do not wish to see the United States become so uninvolved that it can no longer exert control over where and how aid funds are to be placed. Despite the expressed agreement of former Aid Director David Bell with the desirability of a multilateral approach for U.S. aid, the Johnson administration has shown little inclination to move in this direction. The Johnson administration might be willing to give more support to a multilateral approach if other countries involved in administering aid were to indicate a willingness to make more use of international organizations.
I never lost the conviction during my stay in Guinea that America, because of its well-known policy of promoting self-determination for nations and its respect for the sovereignty of independent nations, had an important role to play in safeguarding Guinea's sovereignty. I regretted very much that our policy makers were deceived initially in their efforts to reach an estimate of Sékou Touré and his Government by reports emanating from French sources. I am not trying to say that when Sékou Touré rejected Communist social ideas he rejected also the economic and political ideas which his Marxist orientation caused him to believe could be adapted to the African communal way of life. But when Touré discovered that much of the Russian machinery was unsuited for Guinea's purposes, and realized that showcase enterprises were not helping the Guinean economy, was it correct to believe that he had become disillusioned? It was more likely that Touré was disgusted and disappointed to find his country saddled with useless machinery. Was Touré really disillusioned when he found out how much the Russians had become involved in Guinean internal affairs—an involvement resulting from a false Soviet estimate of the Bloc hold on Guinea? One thing is certain: Touré was thoroughly enraged and ready to take instant action.
It seems to me that disillusionment implies a previous willingness on the part of Touré to place his trust and his fate in the hands of the Communists. Is it not true, however, that Touré's previous dependence on the Communist bloc countries was due partially to a lack of available alternate sources? Of course, Touré might have been more disposed to depend upon the Bloc because of his anticolonialist and anti-imperialist point of view. The fact remains, however, that when he was in deep trouble the first nation to which he turned for modest help was the United States. Did the United States answer this distress signal? Is it possible that what appeared to be an intentional submission to the Communist bloc countries which led inevitably to economic dependence upon bloc aid was nothing more than a hastily improvised “middle of the road” policy devised by inexperienced and bewildered leaders?
It is difficult to say whether or not Touré trusted the Communists and was therefore disillusioned by their perfidy. He never struck me as being naïve, and he was certainly very realistic and toughminded. If he had believed that the Communists would help him and would not attempt to subvert and overthrow his Government, then he might have been a disillusioned leader. But if he remained ever alert to the possibilitles of subversion—and he did react quickly and vigorously to stop demonstrations in 1961 and also expelled the Soviet Ambassador—then he was not disillusioned.
Touré's constant awareness of his precarious position on the international scene—and today, perhaps, on the local scene—and his previous exclusion of any African Communist party from the Guinean political arena seem to indicate that he was a wary individual. Indeed, those who were aware of this quality in Touré were among the first to reject the erroneous reports spread in world capitals in March 1966 concerning his stepping down and turning the presidency of Guinea over to the deposed Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah. Those who had some knowledge of Touré's way of thinking and acting recognized that Touré had bestowed upon Nkrumah nothing more than an “honorific presidency.” It was inconceivable that the Guinean leader, after eight years of struggle to retain the leadership of his country, would hand over the reins to a non-French-speaking former rival.
I have pointed out before my vain efforts to convince Washington officials between 1959 and 1961 that Sékou Touré was an African nationalist who was struggling to maintain and preserve Guinean independence and merited receiving U.S. support. It was very fortunate, therefore, for the future U.S. position in Africa that President Kennedy had the foresight, wisdom, and courage to believe in 1961 that Touré was a nationalist. It was fortunate also that he instructed his diplomatic representative to Guinea, Ambassador William Attwood, to verify his feeling about the Guinean leader. Attwood confirmed Kennedy's conviction about Touré, and Kennedy and Attwood decided upon a course of action in Guinea that made it clear that the United States stood ready to recognize genuine non-alignment.
Recalling how Touré tried to imply that the United States and Kennedy were in some fashion responsible for the death of Patrice Lumumba, and how the Guinean President not only accepted the Lenin Peace Prize, but also publicly affirmed his total support for Castro after the Bay of Pigs incident, Arthur Schlesinger remarks:
Despite all this, Kennedy felt that Sékou Touré remained a nationalist at heart; and, before William Attwood departed as his ambassador to Conakry, the President asked him to verify this as best he could.
Attwood found the American position less hopeless than it seemed from Washington. The Russian aid program, it turned out, was a great mess. The materials were poor, the technicians officious and incompetent, the diplomats insistent and patronizing. Returning to Washington in May, Attwood reported a slow disillusionment and recommended a small American aid program to show Sékou Touré that the United States was willing to go along with genuine non-alignment. Outside the Bureau of African Affairs, the bureaucracy regarded this with disdain as another gust of New Frontier naïveté.
Then Robert Kennedy came back from the Ivory Coast and vigorously backed Attwood.
… By the spring of 1962, American aid was beginning to arrive. … And, when Touré came to New York in October for the UN General Assembly, the President asked him down to Washington. Kennedy met him at the airport and took him back to the White House, where they talked over the problems of Guinea for an hour in the Cabinet Room. Then Kennedy brought him over to the Mansion, introduced him to Jacqueline and Caroline and gave him a formal luncheon.
… From this time on Touré felt that he had a friend at the White House and sent personal messages at the slightest pretext.
The Attwood-Kennedy policy was able to succeed, of course, because it came at the right time. But, if Washington had persisted in its conviction that Guinea was irreclaimable, we would not have been in the position to take advantage of the Soviet errors.
We must stop paying mere lip service to the idea of self-determination for nations and the development of states that are politically independent and economically viable. We must re-examine our policy of containment and stop giving African nations the impression that our interest in them is determined solely by cold-war considerations. We must avoid the appearance of ignoring those nations which are consistently friendly toward us and of rewarding those nations that flout the things for which we stand. We must convince African nations that our African policy is a consistent one, not something made from day to day as we move from one crisis to another. And we must hold up alternatives for these African states other than their having to remain dependent upon their former colonial administrators or being forced to move into the back yards of the Soviet or Chinese Communists. The thought which I have in mind is much better expressed by Dr. Arnold Rivkin, who asserts:
The United States must redress the imbalance in its foreign policies by refocusing its view of American interests in Africa, not by downgrading our traditional interest in Europe or by denying the reality of the cold war, but rather by upgrading the importance of Africa, formulating policies responsive to African realities and striking a reasonable balance among our multiple interests. The United States needs to rationalize its political and economic policies in Africa, to make them consistent and credible and thus responsive to our national interest in the development of stable and viable African states.
Not only from the people of Guinea but also from the people of other developing nations of Africa, I learned of their great desire for immediate change and their earnest hope to have all of the appartenances of modern civilization, including such projects as the Konkouré and Volta Dams. I sensed that fresh in their memories were the unfavorable consequences of colonialism which had made use of racial and social discrimination, and I knew that they little appreciated being reminded that they were trying to accomplish in an incredibly short time what some nations had taken several centuries to achieve. But to me, most remarkable of all was the fact that these people still held the belief that the United States remained the land of the “original anticolonial people.” This belief persisted despite the adverse publicity abroad about the American race problem.
There are indications that the Johnson administration might consider sanctioning U.S. involvement in an effort to draw up a “vast economic program” for emerging African nations, with the idea of creating eventually an African Common Market. It is not perhaps too optimistic to hope that the idea of creating an African Common Market might have some chance of becoming a reality, with the recent entrance on the scene of a new crop of African leaders with a new orientation. (The removal of Nkrumah in Ghana in March 1966 marked the sixth coup in Africa within a four-month period.) Whatever may happen, I trust sincerely that the Johnson administration is going to make a more concerted effort in the very near future to develop an effective and dynamic U.S. policy in Africa. I hope also that in this era of African independence we shall not grow weary and allow our great nation to shirk its responsibilities of world leadership.
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